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 Summary 
The member states of the European Union grant subsidies for various reasons. The purpose of 
such State aid can be economic and social as well as political and strategic. It can correct 
market failures by, for example, supporting research and development as well as investment 
in environmental technology. At the same time however, EC law has indeed a strict view on 
the granting of subsidies, since it may affect the competition through out the union in a 
negative way and thus distort the common market. Member states are therefore obliged to 
notify the Commission and await its examination of the proposed aid measure before putting 
it into action. And before approving a measure, the Commission thoroughly examines its 
compatibility with the Common market. However, while the tasks of examining State aid 
measures and deciding whether they are to be approved or not, or recovered or not, are placed 
upon the Commission, the recovery of unlawful and illegal State aids is to be carried out by 
the national courts, in accordance with national procedures. And as a consequence to the 
frequent slowness and sometimes lack of such procedures, the recovery of illegal State aids 
and the enforcement of State aid rules, have repeatedly been on the Commission’s agenda. In 
addition, changes have been made within the procedure of the Commission’s examination of 
potential State aid measures, where additional exemptions to the obligation to notify under 
Article 88(3) EC Treaty have been approved. By this, the examination in these exempted 
areas has been replaced by conditions in secondary EC law and the Commission’s soft law. 
And as a consequence, the position of the beneficiary seems to have been weakened.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is, in general, to provide a picture of the situation of the 
beneficiaries during the examination and recovery procedure under EC law, and in particular, 
to examine on what grounds a recipient undertaking of unlawful or illegal State aid, believed 
to be lawful and legal, can be protected from recovery by the principle of the protection of 
legitimate expectations. It provides, in other words, an examination and analysis of the 
different sources that may create legitimate expectations. And since such expectations merely 
can be entertained when contrary to a general principle of community law or when 
exceptional circumstances prevail, this thesis also provides a picture of in which context such 
claims can be successfully invoked. Last but not least, the above mentioned changes of the 
State aid field possess indeed a potential of affecting the position of the beneficiary and thus 
the notion of legitimate expectations. Therefore, this report also examines in what way and to 
what extent that may be the case.  
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1. Introduction 
In a pure and flawless market economy, this essay would not have been written. In such an 
economy, state subsidies do not exist. This is however not the reality, neither in the European 
Union (hereinafter referred to as EU) nor rest of the world. Something we indeed have been 
reminded of during recent time; where the reliance on state resources for companies to 
survive has been widely common not only through out the EU. 
 
The granting of State aid has however also a natural place in the economies of the 
Community. The concept is broad and common and governments grant subsidies for various 
reasons. Thus, the purpose of State aid can be economic and social as well as political and 
strategic. It can furthermore act as a corrector of market failures. According to this line of 
reasoning, phenomena as asymmetric information, externalities and economies of scale can 
make it necessary for governments to grant subsidies. And target for such aid can be activities 
such as training or research and investment in environmental protection as well as so called 
Services of General Economic Interest (hereinafter referred to as SGEI).1 In such areas, social 
and political objectives, such as equity, participation, cohesion and solidarity may be reasons 
to grant subsidies.2 Aid may, in the context of SGEI, for example be necessary to guarantee 
the same access to telecommunications and postal services for all citizens of a member state.  
 
However, State aid runs a great risk of affecting the competition, and thus weakening the 
common market and the economy as a whole. The main purpose of State aid control is 
therefore to maintain a level playing field and to protect the common market. For that reason, 
State aid policy has been an integral part of the competition policy since the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957, and since then the Commission has monitored that State aid not 
unduly distorts the competition in the Community.  
 
In order to make State aid rules efficient, enforcement is central. It is thus highly important 
that there exist effective sanctions for breaching State aid rules, and that exceptions are 
carefully applied. However, the enforcement of the State aid rules has due to high numbers of 
un-repaid illegal State aid been target of much attention. For example, the State aid action 
                                                 
1
 Hancher (2006) p. 18.  
2
 Services of General Economic Interest Opinion Prepared by the State aid Group of EAGCP June 29 2006 p. 2.  
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plan (hereinafter referred to as the SAAP)3 provides that “the Commission will pursue a more 
effective policy and will seek to achieve the immediate execution of all recovery decisions”. 
The SAAP further proposes the creation of State aid authorities through out the Community, 
as a way of enhancing the compliance with the State aid rules. Improvements of the rights of 
third parties as well as an upgrade of national rules concerning recovery have furthermore 
been topics of discussion. The Commissioner Neely Kroes gave her opinion on how to 
increase the efficiency of recovery of illegal State aid in a speech during the implementation 
of the SAAP: “I would hope that competitors could become our best allies.”4 
 
While much work is done to improve the efficiency of recovery, the Commission’s scope of 
review has also been target for modification. Through recent case law and the newly adopted 
General Block Exemption Regulation, the possibilities to be exempted from the notification 
and standstill obligations according to Article 88(3) EC Treaty (hereinafter referred to as EC) 
and thus the examination of the Commission has further expanded. The real effect of this has 
probably not yet been shown. In addition, as a consequence of the financial crisis, the granting 
of subsidies has over recent time reached vast proportions. And for each one of these 
disbursements, there exists a recipient undertaking: a beneficiary.  
 
What concerns the beneficiaries’ position, it remains however somewhat weak, not only 
during the notification process but also concerning the recovery of illegal State aids. Since, 
whereas it is highly important that such aids are recovered and that negative effects on the 
competition and the common market are corrected, the requirements of legal certainty call for 
some kind of possibility to be excepted from recovery, i.e. for a recipient undertaking to be 
exempted from the obligation to repay the State aid. This is particularly since State aid rules 
indeed are complicated and because recovery may lead to severe consequences for companies 
forced to repay unlawful or illegal aid, believed to be lawful and legal. Here the possibility to 
rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations prevails, since the 
Community judicatures shall refrain from ordering recovery when it would be contrary to a 
                                                 
3
 State aid action plan – Less and better targeted State aid: a roadmap for State aid reform 2005-2009 
(Consultation document) SEC(2005) 795. 
4
 Speech by European Commissioner for Competition Policy Neelie Kroes: "Reforming Europe's State aid 
Regime: An Action Plan for Change" - 14.06.2005: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= 
SPEECH/05/347&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited 090928) 
The Commissioner has also expressed, in a most recent speech at a conference concerning Private Enforcement 
of State Aid rules (Brussels, 19th October 2009) that ”…if there was some systemic problem in some national 
judicial system, we would ourselves have to consider intervening to make sure that competitors get the necessary 
legal protection.” 
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general principle of community law. And whereas the Community courts have been reluctant 
to allow such claims, the Commission has been somewhat more willing to accept exceptions, 
and thus generated a broader notion of what could constitute legitimate expectations as an 
exemption from the requirement to repay unlawful or illegal State aid. 
1.1 Purpose, Delimitations and Research Questions 
The purpose of this thesis is, in general, to provide a picture of the situation of the 
beneficiaries when under the examination and recovery procedure under EC law, and in 
particular, to examine on what grounds a recipient undertaking of unlawful or illegal State 
aid, believed to be lawful and legal, can be exempted from recovery by claiming the principle 
of the protection of legitimate expectations. However, in order to present an image of the 
beneficiaries’ situation, this report will not only contain an examination and analysis of the 
case law concerning different sources that may create legitimate expectations. It will also 
provide an analysis of potential problems that a beneficiary of illegal or unlawful State aid 
may face. An important part of the purpose is therefore to tie the various sources of legitimate 
expectations and the procedural rules governing that area to the developments in the field of 
enforcement of EC State aid rules. 
 
Similar, for a successful report on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, as 
an exception to recovery of unlawful and illegal State aid, it is necessary to put it in its 
context. This follows since the possibility to entertain such expectations is not merely 
dependent on the subjective situation of the beneficiary, but also on objective circumstances. 
An additional purpose of this thesis is therefore to provide a detailed backdrop on the relevant 
rules within the State aid area as well as the principle of the protection of legitimate 
expectations.  
 
Concerning the delimitations for this thesis, the following should be mentioned. While the 
Procedural Regulation5 provides that the Commission shall not require recovery of the aid if 
that would be contrary to a general principle of community law, I have, despite the existence 
of additional principles, restricted my examination to merely contain the principle of the 
protection of legitimate expectations. This is because the principle of legitimate expectations 
as an exception to recovery is the exemption far most claimed by beneficiaries and dealt with 
                                                 
5
 Council Regulation No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 
(now Art.88) of the EC Treaty, Official Journal L 83/1, 27.03.1999, p. 1-9. 
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by the Community judicatures. It provides, furthermore, a useful knowledge to what kind of 
expectations a beneficiary of State aid may have both when applying for such aid and when in 
a situation where the aid turns out to be unlawful or illegal. Moreover, as claims on legitimate 
expectations indeed are common, I have primarily focused my analysis on cases where such 
claims have been successful, save for typical patterns of unsuccessful cases, where examples 
will be provided. What concerns the developments in the State aid area, I have chosen to 
focus on them affecting the notification and standstill obligations under Article 88(3) EC 
since a common motivation, by the Community judicatures to reject a legitimate expectation 
claim, is that the notification and standstill obligations have not been followed. In addition, 
the notification requirement enables the Commission’s examination, which also possesses an 
important role when discussing legitimate expectations. However, since private parties have 
claimed that soft law, such as the Commission's guidelines, has created legitimate 
expectations, and since the State aid area continues to rely on and create additional such law, 
their role will also be examined.  
 
The expressed purpose and the delimitations lead to the following research questions: 
 
(1) On what grounds can a beneficiary of unlawful or illegal State aid rely on the 
protection of the principle of legitimate expectations as an exception to recovery, i.e. 
on what grounds can a beneficiary legitimately expect that what turns out to be 
unlawful or illegal State aid in fact was lawful and legal? 
 
(2)  Are the Commission’s reliance on soft law and the changes concerning the 
notification and standstill obligations and thus the Commission’s possibility to 
perform its examination under article 88 EC capable of affecting the beneficiary’s 
position and the potential sources of legitimate expectations? 
 
1.2 Material and Method 
As provided, the purpose of this thesis is to examine and analyse the protection of the 
principle of legitimate expectations within the State aid field, but at the same time to present 
an outlook on the notion of recovery from a beneficiary’s view. As a result, while the chosen 
method in the most straightforward way can be described as traditional legal dogmatic 
method, it also composes an additional approach; it aims at providing a picture of the 
beneficiaries’ situation within the notion of recovery. It is however important to note that, 
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while the examination aims at systemizing possible exceptions to recovery provided by the 
principle of legitimate expectations and to present potential problems for beneficiaries due to 
the developments within the State aid field, it does not aim at being exhaustive. The examples 
provided are furthermore a result of an examination of relevant materials, and thus, the result 
an outcome of my interpretation.  
 
As mentioned, the main part of this report is going to be a result of an examination of the 
exception to recovery provided by the principle of legitimate expectations. And since this 
exemption can be relied upon before the Commission in accordance with Article 14 of the 
Procedural Regulation as well as before national and Community courts in line with case law 
and the so called SFEI-doctrine, both these sources will be examined. However, since the 
legal standard to be applied within these two procedures is similar, the potential sources of 
legitimate expectations will be presented together. A discussion on the similarities and 
differences provided by these procedures will however be supplied. Furthermore, to be able to 
provide an image of the beneficiaries’ situation within the notion of recovery, this thesis will 
contain an additional approach, with the main purpose of distinguishing potential problems 
for such recipient undertakings. This approach is rather valuable, since, as mentioned above, 
an important feature for a report on the scope of legitimate expectations, as an exemption to 
recovery, will be to examine and explain in which context such circumstances can exist and 
which procedural features that may generate them. Therefore, by adding this second approach, 
this report will stand a better chance of fulfilling its purpose, and thus not only provide 
guidance for beneficiaries facing a recovery order, but also give examples of certain parts of 
the State aid area with the potential of generating such situations. 
 
As what concerns the material, the main part of the information for this thesis will be 
provided by an examination and analysis of the relevant EC case law. However, as a 
consequence to the purpose of providing a picture of the beneficiaries’ situation within the 
notion of recovery, additional sources will also be examined. This includes relevant 
textbooks, articles, EC law and the Commission’s materials such as guidelines, notions, 
frameworks and so on. Furthermore, I have also contacted the Commission, to hear their view 
on relevant topics. Thus, regarding the first part of this thesis, the backdrop on State aid rules, 
textbooks, articles and the Commission’s information documents will constitute the main 
foundation. However, regarding the developments with potential of affecting the 
beneficiaries’ situation, a more detailed analysis of the relevant regulations and EC case law 
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will be necessary. Moreover, while most of the examination has been focused on case law 
within the State aid field, where the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations has 
been claimed, I have also, in order to acquire a better understanding of the principle, chosen to 
study the notion of legitimate expectations in a more general context. Also this second part of 
the thesis will be a result of an examination of textbooks, articles and EC case law. What 
concerns the third part however, the examination of the different sources of legitimate 
expectations as exceptions to recovery, the Commission’s decisions on State aid will be of 
great interest. This follows since most of the case law concerning such expectations has been 
created under the Commission’s procedure. This third part will naturally also include an 
examination of legitimate expectations in the Community court’s case law, as well as in 
textbooks and articles. 
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2. The State aid area - a backdrop  
The purpose of this section is to provide a useful background of the State aid rules and thus 
the context in which a claim for legitimate expectations can arise. The first part examines 
Article 87 EC and under which circumstances an aid measure can be classified as State aid. 
After that, a closer look on the procedural rules of the State aid area will be provided. This 
includes the notification and standstill obligations under Article 88(3) as well as the 
Commission’s formal investigation procedure, differences between existing and new aid 
measures and the rules governing recovery. Last but not least, the exemptions to the 
obligation to notify provided by regulations and case law will be thoroughly examined. 
 
2.1 State aid according to Article 87 EC 
When dealing with State aid and EC Law, the main rules can be found in article 87 EC. This 
article lays down the test for State aids, and covers aid given to private companies as well as 
public undertakings within the meaning of Article 86 EC.6 Article 87 EC is divided into three 
parts and comprises both single aid measures and aid schemes.7 The first part sets up four 
conditions which must all be met before a measure can be classified as State aid. It also 
establishes the main rule: State aids are incompatible with the common market. There exist 
however exceptions, where the second part of Article 87 provides examples of certain 
exceptions of aid that will be deemed compatible with the common market and the third and 
last part gives examples of cases where aid may be compatible with the common market. 
Concerning the State aid conditions, the first part of Article 87 EC reads as follows:  
 
“Save as otherwise provided in this treaty, any aid granted by a member state 
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens 
to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods shall, insofar as it effects trade between member states, be 
incompatible with the common market.” 
 
                                                 
6
 Compare Craig & de Búrca (2008) s. 1086, Case C-387/92 Banco de Credito Industrial SA [1994] ECR I-877 
and Case T-106/95 Fédération Francaise des Sociétés d’Assurances (FFSA) [ECR] II-229. 
7
 An aid scheme is an aid system under which several aids, to different beneficiaries, can be given. A good 
example can be seen in a tax reduction granted to companies under given circumstances.  
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As provided by this article, to be able to determine whether a measure falls under the 
provision and thus constitutes State aid a measure has to (1) contain some kind of intervention 
from a member state or through state resources (2) confer a benefit or an advantage (3) distort 
or threaten to distort competition and (4) have an effect on inter-state trade.8  
 
(1) Granted by a Member State or through state resources 
The first condition provides that the measure should be granted by a member state or through 
state resources. This means that the benefit or advantage must be brought on by the state. 
According to the European Court of Justice’s (hereinafter referred to as the Court) case law 
this has to be done either directly or indirectly through state resources, but can include central, 
regional or local government bodies as well as private bodies established or appointed by the 
state to direct certain resources, even if they derive from private sources.9 Furthermore, 
resources at the disposal of companies owned or controlled by the state are also met by this 
condition.10 
 
(2) A benefit or an advantage conferred on the recipient 
When acknowledged that a measure emanates from state resources one has to consider 
whether the measure confers a benefit or an advantage on the recipient. However, the Courts’ 
case law does not have its focus on the purpose of a measure; the focus is rather on the effects 
caused by a measure, and whether it confers an advantage or not.11 Thus, the list of 
instruments utilised for conferring an advantage, or in other words, the list of types of aids, is 
a wide one. Examples of these include direct subsidies, tax exemptions and exemptions from 
parafiscal charges, preferential interest rates, favourable loan guarantees and provisions of 
land or buildings on special terms, indemnities against losses, preferential terms for public 
ordering or the deferment of the collection of fiscal or social contributions.12 By that, it is also 
clear that not just objective advantages, but also any form of state action that mitigates the 
charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, without 
                                                 
8
 Craig & de Búrca (2008) p. 1086 ff. Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans [2003] ECR I-7747. 
9
 Hancher (2006) p. 38 f. Case 76/76 Steinike and Weinlig [1977] ECR 595 and C-345/02 Pearle [2004] ECR I-
7139. 
10
 Art. 2, Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 Transparency of financial relations between 
member states and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings, Official 
Journal L 318, 17.11.2006, pages 17 – 25. Hereinafter referred to as the Transparency Directive.  
11
 See for examples Case 173/73, Italy v Commission [1974] ECR Page 00709, Case C-241/94 France v 
Commission [1996] ECR I-04551 para. 20. Case C-382/99 the Netherlands v Commission [2002] ECR I-05163 
para. 61. 
12
 Craig & de Búrca (2008) p. 1087.  
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therefore being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have 
the same effect, are considered as State aid.13 
 
As provided, the scope of instruments that can confer an advantage is a wide on. It is, 
however, also useful to consider its outer boundaries: a granted economic benefit only 
constitutes State aid if it displays a degree of selectivity. Hence, a measure, which without 
distinction, benefits all companies in a national territory can therefore not constitute State 
aid.14 Furthermore, as the Court held in the Altmark case, since it is central to the idea of State 
aid that it confers an advantage, assistance given to offset public service obligations 
incumbent on the beneficiary of the aid will not meet all the conditions in Article 87 EC, 
however, provided that the conditions expressed in the Altmark case are fulfilled.15  
 
(3) Distorts or threatens to distort the competition 
Moreover, to constitute State aid, a measure has to distort or threaten to distort the 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods. Under this 
condition, the Community courts will regard the company’s position before and after an aid, 
and assess whether its situation has improved.16 The question whether the measure distorts or 
threatens to distort the competition is furthermore linked to the condition whether the measure 
has an effect on trade between member states. Therefore, when the inter-state trade is 
affected, the competition is often distorted.17  
 
(4) Has an effect on Inter-state trade 
The last condition under article 87(1) EC, whether the measure affects trade between member 
states, is met if the aid strengthens the financial position of a company, compared to other 
enterprises within the Community. It is however sufficient for the Commission to show that 
the trade might be affected and not that it actually is affected. Furthermore, according to case 
law, the fact that the aid or the recipient undertaking is relatively small does not exclude the 
                                                 
13
 Case Case C-387/92 Banco de Credito Industrial SA, para. 13-14 and Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke 
Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg [1961] ECR I-1 para. 19. 
14
 Case C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline [2001] ECR I-8365, para. 34 f. 
15
 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans, for the conditions see section 2.2.5.2 “Services of General Economic Interest”. 
16
 Case 173/73 Italy v Commission. 
17 Hettne & Fritz  (2008) p. 9, see also Joined cases T-298/97, T-312/97, T-313/97, T-315/97, T-600/97-T-
607/97, T-1/98, T-3/98-T-6/98 och T-23/98, Alzetta Mauro and others v Commission [2000] ERC II-02319, para 
81. 
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possibility of an effect on trade between member states.18 In addition, the fact that a 
beneficiary provided local transport services did not stop the Court from stating that the aid 
could have an effect on Inter-state trade, since such a financial support can make it more 
difficult for transport companies from other member states to penetrate the market.19 
According to the Court, this is because several member states since 1995 have started to open 
certain transport markets to competition from companies established in other member states, 
“so that a number of undertakings are already offering their urban, suburban or regional 
transport services in member states other than their State of origin.”20 
 
2.2 Procedural rules 
2.2.1 The concept of Article 88(3) EC – Notification and Standstill  
The procedural rules of the State aid area are found in Article 88 EC, the Procedural 
Regulation and in the Community courts’ case law. Article 88(3) EC states:21  
 
“The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit 
its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it considers that any such 
plan is not compatible with the common market having regard to Article 87, 
it shall without delay initiate the procedure provided for in paragraph 2. 
The member state concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect 
until this procedure has resulted in a final decision.” 
 
The obligation to notify encompasses, according to Article 1(a) of the Procedural Regulation 
any measure fulfilling the criteria laid down in Article 87(1) EC, which means that the scope 
of the notification requirement in Article 88(3) EC is identical to that of Article 87(1) EC. As 
a consequence, the first part of this article lays down a duty to notify any plans of State aid 
before implementing or altering them. 
 
                                                 
18
 Case C-142/87, Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I-959, para. 43, joined cases C-278/92, C-279/92, C-
280/92, Spain v Commission [1994] ECR I-4103, para. 40-42 and case C-280/00 Altmark trans, para. 77-82. It 
exists however so called de minimis aids, which are aid measures exempted from notification when under a 
certain ceiling: see section 2.2.5 “Exemptions to the Obligations of Notification and Standstill”. 
19
 Case C-280/00 Altmark trans, para. 77-82.  
20
 Ibid. para. 79. 
21
 The requirement of notification under article 88(3) is reiterated in article 2(1) of the Procedural Regulation.   
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The obligation to notify creates a possibility for the Commission to exercise a preliminary 
investigation to whether a planned aid or an aid scheme is compatible with the common 
market and can be implemented or whether it should be target for a formal investigation. 
What concerns aid schemes; it is enough for the Commission to examine the scheme, and not 
each particular individual case in which it applies.22 Furthermore, it is for the Commission 
alone to assess the compatibility with the common market. A Commission decision may 
however be subject of review by the Community courts. It is conversely not possible, 
according to the Community courts’ jurisprudence, for a national court to declare a State aid 
measure compatible with article 87(2-3) EC.23  
 
In addition to notification, member states are under the obligation to stand still. This means, 
as expressed in the last sentence of article 88(3) EC, that a member state shall not put its 
proposed aid measures into effect until the Commission has given a final decision. Moreover, 
the Procedural Regulation states that the aid is not to be implemented before the Commission 
has taken such a decision or is deemed to have taken such a decision. This means that aid 
which is exempted from notification, for example through a block exemption, may be put into 
effect. Such aid is then viewed upon as existing State aid.24  
 
After receiving a notification, the Commission shall communicate this to the state in question 
and thereafter within two months execute a preliminary investigation of the proposed aid 
measure and take a decision. Should the Commission fail to take such a decision, the standstill 
obligation will expire and the member state may then put the aid into effect, given that the 
Commission once again has been notified and not taken a decision within a period of 15 
working days.25 Also such aid is viewed upon as existing State aid.  
 
As expressed in the Procedural Regulation the Commission can conclude the preliminary 
examination in three different ways. Firstly, the Commission can come to the conclusion that 
the measure does not constitute State aid.26 It follows from such a decision that no obligations 
or conditions can be imposed, thus, it is for the member state and the beneficiary a favourable 
                                                 
22
 Sinnaeve (2007) p. 3 and Case C-66/02, Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I-10901, para 91. 
23
 Ibid. and Case C-199/06 Centre d’exportation du livre français (CELF) [2008] ECR I-00469, para. 38, Case C-
17/91, Lornoy and Others [1992] ECR I-6523, para. 30 and Case C-354/90, Fédération Nationale du Commerce 
Extérieur des Produits Alimentaires (FNCE) [1991] ECR I-5505, para. 14. 
24
 Hancher (2006) p. 641. 
25
 Hettne & Fritz (2008) p. 17 and the Procedural Regulation, Article 4(5-6). 
26
 The Procedural Regulation, Article 4(2).  
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decision. Secondly, the preliminary procedure can be completed by a positive decision, which 
means that the Commission has found that the measure constitutes State aid but is compatible 
with the common market.27 The measure can in other words be exempted under one of the 
exceptions given by the Treaty.28 Thirdly, the Commission can conclude the preliminary 
procedure by initiating the formal investigation procedure under Article 88(2) EC. Such a 
decision will be taken where the Commission finds that doubts are raised as to the 
compatibility with the common market of a notified measure.29  
 
2.2.2 The Formal Investigation Procedure  
The formal investigation procedure is expressed in Article 88(2) EC and in Article 6(1) of the 
Procedural Regulation, and is a more in-depth examination where member states and other 
interested parties are given the opportunity to submit their comments. In addition, the 
Commission organises, in general, meetings with the national authorities. The formal 
investigation procedure is moreover terminated in a similar way as the preliminary 
investigation; the Commission can conclude that the notified measure does not constitute 
State aid, that the measure constitutes State aid but one of the exemptions is applicable or that 
the aid is incompatible with the common market and should be recovered.30 In addition to 
this, the Commission often finds aid measures partly incompatible with the common market. 
This means, in other words, that only a part of the proposed aid is compatible and thus 
approved.31 
 
Concerning the beneficiaries’ role during the formal investigation procedure, the following 
can be mentioned. When performing its review the Commission is bound to conduct a diligent 
and impartial examination, which follows from the interest of sound administration and the 
fundamental rules of the Treaty. Concerning the beneficiaries’ right to be heard during this 
review; it is answered diversely dependent on whether the review is initiated against the 
beneficiary or not. This is since it follows from the Fleuren case that when the review 
concerns a potential aid measure and the recipient enterprise therefore merely is a potential 
beneficiary and not de facto a beneficiary, the recipient undertaking does not play a special 
                                                 
27
 Ibid, Article 4(3).  
28
 See article 87 EC Treaty. 
29
 The Procedural Regulation, Article 4(4). 
30
 The Procedural Regulation, Article 7. 
31
 Hancher (2006) p. 637 ff. 
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role pursuant to any provision governing that procedure and can therefore not lay any claims 
to an exchange of arguments with the Commission. The applicant in the Fleuren case was thus 
unsuccessful when claiming that the Commission, before taking an unfavourable decision 
concerning a proposed aid measure, should be obligated to seek information not only through 
the member state but also from potential beneficiaries.32 Hence, the outcome of this case 
means, for the potential beneficiary, that it possesses a rather weak position, and is dependant 
on the willingness of its member state to involve it. At the same time however, the Court of 
First Instance (hereinafter referred to as the CFI) also made it clear that if the review on the 
other hand concerns an aid measure initiated against a beneficiary, such a company can rely 
on rights as extensive as the rights of the defence as such and thereby a right to be heard.33 
According to the Court, this follows since the Commission, under its formal investigation 
procedure, is obligated to give notice to the interested parties to submit their comments.34 An 
enterprise in such a situation can therefore exchange arguments with the Commission, and if 
necessary claim legitimate expectations.  
 
2.2.3 Differences between Existing and New State Aids 
Concerning the distinction between existing and new aid measures it can firstly be said that it 
is not a clear cut, and has therefore been a source of dispute; while member states often take 
the position that the aid measure is covered by an earlier decision and therefore constitutes an 
existing aid and not a new one, the Commission frequently has the opposite view.35 The 
reason why this is important is not the question whether the measure can be challenged by the 
Commission or not, since both new and existing aid can be target for a Commission 
investigation. The distinction is however essential because the qualification of an aid measure 
as falling under an existing aid scheme provides the beneficiary with great protection. This 
follows since such aid is exempted from the obligation to notify and thus also the risk of 
recovery. For a new aid on the contrary, both the notification and the standstill obligations 
have to be followed, or the beneficiary runs a great risk of having to repay the granted aid.  
 
                                                 
32
 Case T-109/01 Fleuren Compost BV [2004] ECR II-00127 paras. 38 and 40-44. 
33
 Ibid. paras. 40-44.  
34
 Joined cases C-74/00 P and C-75/00 P. Falck SpA and Acciaierie di Bolzano SpA v Commission [2002] ECR 
I-07869, para. 79-83. 
 
35
 Hancher (2006) p. 628. 
 Recovery of Illegal State Aid – From a Beneficiary’s View                         14 
As what concerns the distinction between new and existing aid, the former also comprises 
alterations of existing aid schemes. However, the CFI has expressed that an alteration only 
generates a new scheme, and thus requires notification, where the changes affects the actual 
substance of the original scheme. This means that neither technical alterations, which cannot 
affect the Commissions assessment, nor an increase in the original budget of 20 percent,36 call 
for a new notification.37 Hence, the CFI did not classify two amendments to an aid scheme in 
Gibraltar as alterations since they merely extended the category of exempted operations and 
did therefore not alter the character of the existing aid. Thus, the alterations did not constitute 
a new State aid.38 
 
2.2.4 Recovery of Illegal and Unlawful State Aid 
State aid implemented before notification and in breach of the standstill obligation is unlawful 
but not necessarily illegal. This is because, also unlawful State aids are to be examined by the 
Commission and assessed upon whether they are compatible with the common market or 
not.39 And as expressed in the CELF-case, should the Commission find the unlawful aid 
measure to be compatible with the common market, the community law does not impose an 
obligation of full recovery. The recipient of such aid is however obliged to pay interest on the 
amount in question, and the national court may, within the framework of its own domestic 
law, also recover the unlawful aid.40 Should the Commission however come to the conclusion 
that no exception under Article 87 EC is applicable; the State aid is illegal and must be 
recovered. And when the Commission takes such a recovery decision, it is up to the 
concerned member state to take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the recipient.41 
The decision shall then be executed immediately, but according to the procedure given by the 
national law. It is furthermore possible for the Commission to take a preliminary decision that 
a member state immediately has to cancel the disbursements and recover a non-notified aid.42 
 
                                                 
36
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down 
detailed rules for the application of Art. 93 of the EC Treaty, O.J. 2004, L 140/1, Article 4(1): such small budget 
increases are unlikely to affect the Commissions assessment.   
37
 Sinnaeve (2007) p. 4 f. 
38
 Joined cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II-02309, paras. 112-116. 
39
 Commission notice on State aid enforcement by national courts p. 7: Case C-301/87, France v Commission 
(Boussac) [1990] I-307, paras. 17-23, Case C-142/87, Belgium v Commission (Tubemeuse) [1990] ECR I-959, 
paras. 15-19, Case C-354/90 FNCE,  para. 14 and Case C-199/06, CELF, para. 38. 
40
 Case C-199/06 CELF, paras. 46, 51 & 53. 
41
 Procedural Regulation, Article 14. 
42
 Case C-301/87 Boussac, para 19. 
 Recovery of Illegal State Aid – From a Beneficiary’s View                         15 
However, the presence of an illegal aid measure does not always lead to recovery. Because, 
recovery is merely possible when the aid has been disbursed, the limitation period for 
recovery has not expired43 and the recovery of the aid is not contrary to any general principle 
of community law, for example the proportionality principle or the principle of legitimate 
expectations,44 where the latter will be thoroughly examined further on. The Commission is 
furthermore, according to the Procedural Regulation, required to ex officio examine whether 
any such general principle could hinder a recovery, and should the Commission fail to do so, 
the Commission decision can be challenged before the Community courts.45  
 
Should the Commission however order the recovery of an illegal or unlawful State aid, such 
an order is applied most strictly. For example, the fact that a member state comes upon 
unexpected administrative difficulties when executing a recovery decision is not reason 
enough to omit the decision. Such a conduct is merely possible when the member state can 
show that an execution of the recovery decision has been impossible. The fact that a recovery 
would lead to the recipient company being wound up is, however, not a legitimate reason for 
claiming impossibility to the execution of the decision.46  
 
The purpose of recovery is to reinstate the situation which preceded the disbursement of the 
illegal State aid. The recipient of such State aid is therefore not only obliged to repay the aid 
in question, but is also required to pay interest. By this, the recipient will concede the 
advantage created by the illegal aid measure and the preceded situation will be reinstated.47 Or 
as expressed by the Court, “re-establishment of the previously existing situation is obtained 
once the unlawful and incompatible aid is repaid by the recipient who thereby forfeits the 
advantage which they enjoyed over their competitors in the market, and the situation as it 
existed prior to the granting of the aid is restored".48 
 
2.2.5 Exemptions to the Obligations of Notification and Standstill  
As provided, the notification and standstill obligations make the Commission’s examination 
possible. What concerns certain aid measures however, the Commission has already made up 
                                                 
43
 The limitation period is, according to the Procedural Regulation Article 15, 10 years.  
44
 Edström (2007) p. 66 and the Procedural Regulation, Article 14(1). 
45
 Hancer (2006) p. 680 and the Procedural Regulation, Article 14(1).  
46
 Edström (2007) p. 68 and Case C- 261/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-02537. 
47
 Case C-350/93, Commission v Italy [1995] ECR I-699, paras. 21-22 and Case C-110/02, Commission v 
Council [2004] ECR I-06333, para. 42. 
48
 Case C-348/93, Commission v Italy [1995] ECR I-673, para. 27. 
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its mind. These exempted aid measures can thus be implemented without prior notification 
and examination by the Commission. While this is a change in line with the ongoing 
simplification process that aims at reducing the Commission’s work load, it may also create 
complicated situations for beneficiaries. Thus, on the one hand, the exemptions to notification 
have been carefully prepared and may lead to benefits within the State aid area, since, as 
expressed in the General Block Exemption Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the GBER), 
“The Commission has applied Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty in numerous decisions and 
gained sufficient experience to define general compatibility criteria…”49 Furthermore, the 
GBER as well as the Decision on SGEI50 also set certain thresholds that must be respected, 
and aid that exceeds such thresholds is not exempted from the notification and standstill 
obligations and must therefore be notified and individually examined by the Commission. In 
addition, exempted aid measures have to meet precise conditions to escape notification, and 
only the aid measures with the least risk of distortion is exempted. However, on the other 
hand, a great number of aid measures are implemented in line with these exemptions. For 
example, in 2007, the member states introduced more than 1100 block exempted measures.51 
Moreover, this procedure also means that more responsibility is moved from EU level to the 
member states and thus also the beneficiaries, since they have to control whether the proposed 
measure is in line with an exemption. And as will be shown by a closer look at the different 
exemptions, an increasing number of unnotified aid measures may affect the future 
expectations of such beneficiaries. 
 
2.2.5.1 Block Exemptions 
In 1998, the Council regulation on the application of Articles 92 and 93 EC (now Articles 87 
and 88 EC) to certain categories of horizontal State aid was adopted.52 It constitutes the act 
enabling the Commission to adopt so called Block exemption regulations, but has also 
                                                 
49
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible 
with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption 
Regulation) Official Journal L 214, 9.8.2008, p. 3–47, Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of 15 
December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid, Official Journal L 379 
of 28.12.2006. 
50
 Commission Decision of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty to State aid 
in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of 
services of general economic interest Official Journal L 312, 29.11.2005, p. 67-73. 
51
 Report from the Commission, State aid Scoreboard spring 2008 update, COM/2008/0304/final. Compared to 
410 block exempted measures under 2006, this is a significant increase.  
52
 Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 (now 87 and 88 
respectively) of the Treaty establishing the European community to certain categories of horizontal State aid, 
Official Journal L 142, 14.05.1998, pages 1-4. 
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allowed the Commission to create an exemption concerning so called de minimis aid, which is 
aid of smaller amounts deemed not to meet all the criteria set out in Article 87(1) EC. Block 
exemption regulations declare specific categories of State aid compatible with the Treaty and 
enable member states to grant aid that meets the conditions laid down in the regulations 
without the formal notification procedure. Member states are only required to submit 
information sheets on the implemented aid, which then is viewed upon as existing aid. At the 
same time however, an exemption means that such subsidies will not come under an 
individual examination of the Commission. And should the aid turn out not to qualify under 
an exemption, the aid will, what concerns recovery, be treated as new unlawfully granted 
State aid.  
 
The first Block exemption regulation merely included aid to SME and training aid.53 The 
categories have however grown over the years, and in 2008, the Commission issued the 
GBER.54 This is one of the most important novelties in the State aid governance, and means 
that all of the block exemptions now are provided by the same regulation. The GBER has 
however also introduced new exemptions, and in some extent modified the existing ones.55 
Consequently, while the first exemptions were introduced as early as 2001, it is during the last 
years the granting of exempted aid measures has reached rather high numbers.56 
 
The exemptions pose, furthermore, many similarities to aid schemes. This follows since also 
an aid scheme creates a situation where aid awards are not subject to any individual 
evaluation by the Commission. Since, by authorizing an aid scheme, the Commission exempts 
subsidies given under that scheme from the notification and standstill obligations under 
                                                 
53
 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 70/2001 of 12 Jan. 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC 
Treaty to State aid to small and medium sized enterprises, O.J. 2001, L10/33 and Commission Regulation (EC) 
No. 68/2001 of 12 Jan. 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to training aid, O.J. 2001, 
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54
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1998 regarding the application of Articles 87 (ex-Article 92) and 88 (ex-Article 93) of the EC Treaty to certain 
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Article 88(3) EC. This means that, problems of evaluating in advance potential consequences 
of an abstract aid scheme and subsequently leaving the application to member states, as 
provided by the GBER, had already been reality before its introduction.57 Despite the 
similarities between aid schemes and the GBER it is however important to note that, when aid 
schemes are notified, they are generally target for modifications during the preliminary 
examination phase, where the Commission tries to secure that the proposed aid scheme 
complies with the State aid rules, by for example requesting additional information.58 This 
inter-action between member states and the Commission makes it possible to alter the 
notification, add necessary clauses in a draft law and may thus correct flaws before the 
scheme is laid down in national legislation. As provided by the notion of block exemptions, 
this cannot take place when subsidies are granted under such a regulation. As a consequence, 
the responsibility to verify that an aid measure complies with the conditions laid down in an 
exemption is transferred from EU level to national level, something that creates difficult 
questions of legal certainty. Since, while a measure under an aid scheme, that has been 
notified and authorized, is legal as long as it complies with the terms of the scheme, there is 
no guarantee that a block exempted aid measure at the start actually fulfilled all the conditions 
set out in the regulation. This affects national authorities as well as competitors and 
beneficiaries.59  
 
What concerns beneficiaries, it can first be held that block exemptions improve their position 
in many ways. For example, such exemptions seem to offer a quicker procedure and increased 
transparency, as they make information more attainable. Regarding legal certainty however, 
the exemptions possess some inconvenience. For instance, if a potential beneficiary has any 
doubts concerning the application of a condition under an exemption, the company would be 
in a difficult position. This is especially so since, as mentioned above, the procedure of 
making an aid measure comply with certain conditions is not always an easy task. And as the 
potential beneficiary is not legally involved in this procedure and thus lacks the possibility to 
be a proper part of the pre-granting process,60 should such a situation occur, he could merely 
try to seek clarification through the member state or simply refuse the aid. The company is in 
other words not in a position to demand an active role what concerns the procedure, and it has 
therefore been argued that this weak position reduces the incentive they could have to control 
                                                 
57
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 Sinnaeve (2001) p. 9.  
60
 See section  2.3.1 ”The Formal Investigation Procedure”.  
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whether the aid measure or aid scheme is in accordance with the relevant exemption.61 An 
assumption, which in practice could cause considerable problems concerning what a 
beneficiary of such aid legitimately can expect. This regards not only the conditions provided 
in the GBER but also more generally the notification and standstill obligations under Article 
88(3) EC.  
 
2.2.5.2 Services of General Economic Interest 
Apart from Block exemptions, another scope of measures which are exempted from the 
requirement of notification and standstill, are those which includes SGEI. Whereas the aid 
measures excepted through block exemptions must fulfill certain conditions under the GBER, 
the possibility to be exempted through the notion of SGEI requires either that particular 
conditions set out in the Altmark case62 are met or that the requirements in the Decision on 
SGEI are fulfilled. There is however one important difference, while meeting the conditions 
in the Altmark case means that the measure does not constitute State aid, the exemption under 
the Decision on SGEI is merely a way of exempting State aid from notification, similar to a 
block exemption.63  
 
The financial support to public or private entrusted companies as compensation for the 
performance of services imposed upon them in the general economic interest has been vividly 
discussed over many years. While earlier case law has been somewhat ambiguous towards the 
question whether State funding to companies executing obligations in the general economic 
interest could be viewed as a mere compensation, and not an advantage within the meaning of 
Article 87(1) EC,64 later case law has provided further clarity to the question. This is foremost 
through the above mentioned Altmark case, which states that compensation for performance 
of a public service obligation is merely viewed upon as compensation and escapes thus the 
classification of State aid under article 87(1) EC, given that four cumulative conditions are 
fulfilled.65 As a consequence, such a measure does not require notification under article 88(3) 
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 Case C-280/00 Altmark trans.  
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 Report from the Commission, State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2008 Update, COM (2008) 751 final, Brussels, 
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 Hancher (2006) p. 206.  
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 (1) the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge, and the obligations 
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EC. Conversely, should one of the conditions not be met, while the measure satisfies the 
criteria under article 87(1), it constitutes State aid and shall be notified to the Commission 
according to article 88(3).66  
 
The question has furthermore been clarified by the Commission, where it, for example, has 
issued a Communication and a Decision, where, as mentioned above, the Decision on SGEI 
functions similar to a block exemption. What concerns the Altmark doctrine however, and 
thus the possibility to escape the classification of State aid, difficulties still exist. Since, while 
the Commission’s documents give guidance on how to apply it, the conditions provided by 
the Altmark case have in practice, due to the uncertainty of their exact meaning, proved to be 
rather complicated to apply.67 There are, for example, difficulties linked to the defining of a 
SGEI, since, whereas the scope of what can constitute an SGEI indeed is a wide one,68 it is 
not possible to deem every service as a SGEI. This is because, as stated in the Altmark case, 
the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge, and the 
obligations must be clearly defined. And even though much discretion is placed upon the 
member states, the Commission ensures, what regards the definition, that this margin of 
discretion is applied without manifest errors.69 
 
As provided, the notion of SGEI does not only exempt aid measures from the notification and 
standstill obligations, it also possesses difficulties what concerns the exact boundaries of its 
scope. It can therefore be held the same about SGEI as what concerns block exemptions; the 
procedure of making an aid measure comply with certain conditions is not always an easy 
task, a situation which in practice could cause considerable problems concerning what a 
beneficiary of such aid legitimately can expect. What concerns the Altmark doctrine however, 
it is of interest to note that the legal uncertainty and the risk of recovery felt by potential 
                                                                                                                                                        
into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations, (4) where the 
undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations, in a specific case, is not chosen pursuant to a public 
procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at 
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to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those 
obligations. (Case C-280/00 Altmark trans, para. 87-93). 
66
 Hancher (2006) p. 208. 
67
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 Community framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation, OJ C 297, 29.11.2005, p. 4-7. 
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beneficiaries has lead to very few implementations of such measures, and thus, at least not 
yet, caused any real problems.70    
 
2.2.5.3 The CELF case – an Exception to Notification? 
The exemption to notification provided by the recent CELF-case71 is not in theory a valid 
exception, but may in practice reduce the incentives to notify aid measures before 
implementing them. What concerns the outcome of the case, it has been argued that it 
constitutes an exception to the recovery of unlawful State aid, and that it may harm the effect 
of the notification and standstill obligations and thus the Commission’s possibility of 
conducting its review.72 It can however also be argued that it establishes an additional 
exception to the notification and standstill obligation under Article 88(3) EC. This follows 
since it seems like a proper sanction for the granting of unlawful, but not illegal State aid, no 
longer exists, something that may reduce granting authorities’ tendency to notify and 
standstill when implementing State aids that they deem to be legal. 
 
The CELF-case concerned the French Centre d’exportation du livre français (CELF) which 
received State aid on an annual basis between 1980 and 2002. The disbursements relevant in 
this context are the subsidies granted before the first Commission decision, thus in breach of 
the notification and standstill obligations under Article 88(3) EC, but which after they had 
come to the Commission’s attention and examination was found to be compatible with the 
common market within the meaning of article 87(1) EC. The question therefore concerned 
whether the national court was bound to recover aid paid in breach of the notification and 
standstill obligations under article 88(3) EC, when the Commission subsequently found the 
aid measure compatible with the common market, i.e. unlawful but not illegal State aid.73   
 
While earlier case law on this matter mainly is based on the purpose of the effectiveness of 
the standstill obligation and thus the scope of the Commission’s control function,74 the CELF-
case is primarily based on the purpose of only implementing compatible aid measures. 
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Conversely to what the Court had stated in previous cases,75 it therefore held that even in the 
absence of exceptional circumstances, community law does not impose an obligation of full 
recovery of such unlawful aid.76  
 
It is however not entirely that simple, since the Court agreed to that the aid recipient is given 
advantages, firstly, due to the non-payment of interest it would have had to pay if it had 
borrowed the same amount on the market while awaiting the Commission’s decision, and, 
secondly, due to the improvement of its competitive position, as against other operators in the 
market while the unlawfulness lasts. Consequently, the Court stated that, the national court 
must order the aid recipient to pay interest in respect of the period of unlawfulness, and that, 
the national court may if it is appropriate, in accordance with national law, also order the 
recovery of the unlawful aid and uphold claims for compensation for damage caused by 
reason of the aid.77  
 
Accordingly, on the one hand, the exception to notification of State aids which are deemed to 
be compatible with the common market can be seen as a non-exhaustive exception, and thus 
rather a way of mitigating the consequences of an unlawfully granted aid. On the other hand 
however, the national court is not obligated to recover such aid granted in breach of Article 
88(3) EC. Hence, it can be argued that a situation as this is exempted from the main principle 
of notification. 
3. The Principle of the Protection of Legitimate Expectations – a 
Part of the Community Legal Order 
Before we have a look at the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations as an 
exception to recovery of State aid, it is of value to analyse its more general scope, as one of 
                                                 
75
 Provided by for example the Case C-368/04 Transalpine Ölleitung, para. 41: “A Commission decision finding 
aid that was not notified compatible with the common market does not have the effect of regularising ex post 
facto implementing measures which were invalid because they were taken in disregard of the prohibition laid 
down by the last sentence of Article 88(3) EC, since otherwise the direct effect of that provision would be 
impaired and the interests of individuals, which are to be protected by national courts, would be disregarded 
Any other interpretation would have the effect of according a favourable outcome to the non-observance of that 
provision by the member state concerned and would deprive it of its effectiveness…” and in p. 42: whether 
compatible with the common market or not, failure to comply with Article 88(3) EC carried no greater risk or 
penalty than compliance, the incentive for member states to notify and await a decision on compatibility would 
be greatly diminished – as would, consequently, the scope of the Commission’s control.”  
76
 Case C-199/06 CELF, para. 46. 
77
 Ibid. para. 50-53. 
 Recovery of Illegal State Aid – From a Beneficiary’s View                         23 
the fundamental principles of EC law. This makes it possible to observe and understand its 
judicial requirements as well as its legal effects. 
 
3.1 Background 
As mentioned, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is one of the 
fundamental principles of community law.78 It is closely linked to the principle of legal 
certainty, and has been derived from the rule of law concept; it appears to be an expression in 
the form of a subjective right of legal certainty. While the two principles are closely linked, 
the Court has however not provided a clear answer to their correlation.79 Furthermore, in the 
national law of the member states, the principle of legitimate expectations merely protects 
against individual measures, while in community law, it has also been found to encompass 
protection against legislative measures.80 An important feature of the principle of legitimate 
expectations is thus that the law should not differ from what can reasonably be expected.  
 
The principle of legitimate expectations originally developed in German law, but began to 
gain acceptance in European law during the 1970s and 1980s. Briefly explained, it means that 
any individual, who, because of governmental conduct holds certain expectations relating to 
future governmental activity, can require those expectations to be fulfilled unless there exist 
compelling public interest for not doing so. It protects, in other words, participants on the 
market against unreasonable and unforeseeable effects, as results of judicatures’ discretionary 
right to adopt new rules or decisions.81 This is for example articulated by the Court in the 
Mavrides case, where it held that the protection of legitimate expectations extends to any 
individual who is in a situation in which it appears that the administration’s conduct has led 
him to entertain reasonable expectations.82 And, since the principle of legitimate expectations 
is a part of the general principles of community law it is granted priority status over other 
community instruments, regardless of whether the latter are rules of community law or 
administrative decisions.83 As expressed in the Töpfer Case, the principle of the protection of 
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legitimate expectations forms part of the community legal order with the result that any 
failure to comply with it is an infringement of the Treaty. 84  
 
3.2 Requirements for relying on the Principle of Legitimate Expectations 
3.2.1 Derived from a Community Institution’s Conduct 
The notion of the principle of legitimate expectations requires certain conditions to be 
fulfilled if a company or an individual should be able to rely on it. Hence, for expectations to 
be legitimate, they have to be derived from a Community institution’s conduct. This suffices 
some kind of identifiable positive behaviour on the part of the Community institutions, and 
can, for instance, be in form of a favourable administrative measure or a precise and specific 
assurance that may cause a person to entertain justifiable hopes.85 Justified expectations may, 
furthermore, be created by consistent administrative practice or concern the continuation of a 
legal position. Inaction on the part of the Commission during the passage of time may also 
constitute assistance to a claim of legitimate expectations.86 It is not, however, sufficient with 
a general expectation that the Commission will take full account of differences in market 
conditions.87  
 
Furthermore, the positive behaviour from a Community institution shall be in the form of a 
clear and precise commitment from the Communities.88 Thus, a person may not plead an 
infringement unless he has been given a precise assurance by the authority.89 This can for 
example be in form of a so-called comfort letter in which the Commission in a given 
competition case states that no action will be taken. It can furthermore contain measures such 
as supplying information through faxes, agreements, circulars, reports, communications and 
code of conducts or through statements made by EP ministers. Concerning other soft law 
measures however, such as interpretative Council declarations and recommendations, the 
status is less clear.90 And concerning oral measures, they may create legitimate expectations, 
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if they constitute very precise assurances.91 Such measures are however often difficult to 
prove and carry thus generally less weight than written statements.92  
 
Legitimate expectations can furthermore be derived from general conduct within a 
Community institution, which means that an institution can bind itself to its customs. This 
does however not apply to situations where the institution has bound itself to unreasonable or 
illegal manners.93 In addition, the fact that a situation has existed for years does not 
automatically result in any right to an indefinite maintenance of the situation.94 There are 
however examples where this has been the case, see for example the Rijn-Schelde Verolme 
case, which is a case within the State aid area.95 
 
3.2.2 The need of an Objective and a Subjective Dimension  
It has at several occasions been shown by the Community courts that a company or an 
individual can, under the right conditions, entertain legitimate expectations. To give the 
circumstances under which such expectations is possible, is however far from easy. What can 
be mentioned though, besides the fact that legitimate expectations have to be derived from a 
Community institution’s conduct, is that the circumstances can be divided into objective and 
subjective ones.96  
 
What concerns the objective conditions; these are not dependent on the person seeking the 
protection of the principle of legitimate expectations. Instead, it has to, as mentioned above, 
exist an action on the part of a Community institution which can create a situation that 
justifies a reliance on the principle. Such an action may be produced by a lawful or unlawful 
administrative measure, which confers some kind of benefit. It can also concern the 
continuation of a legal situation.97 
 
Legitimate expectations requires, furthermore, from a subjective kind of view that the 
company must have acted on the expectation or refrained from taking action which it would 
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otherwise have taken.98 Moreover, the affected undertaking must not have acted in such a way 
as to preclude its reliance on the expectation.99 A beneficiary cannot for example entertain 
legitimate expectations, when it has provided the Commission with false or incomplete 
information.100 The change must furthermore not have been foreseeable for the enterprise, 
thus, the reliance on legitimate expectations is not possible if a company, for example, has 
been aware of the unlawful nature of the measure, the conditions for the promised adoption of 
an administrative measure has not been fulfilled or the change in a legal position by a 
retroactive regulation has been of a foreseeable nature.101  
 
What concerns administrative measures, a legitimate expectations must be an individual and 
concrete expectation of the company affected. An undertaking should therefore carefully 
examine the relevant community law and not rely exclusively on information provided by its 
national authority. This follows since a company cannot hold legitimate expectations when 
community law is infringed by such authorities.102  
 
Regarding reliance on a legal situation created by a normative act and expectations that this 
situation will continue to apply, for expectations to be legitimate, they must be held by a 
prudent trader acting in accordance with the law. This means that, if such a trader could have 
foreseen the adoption of a community measure likely to affect his interest, he cannot entertain 
any legitimate expectations if the measure is adopted.103 Hence, the applicant, in the 
Christmas butter case, could not entertain legitimate expectations as to the non-
implementation of additional Christmas butter schemes (a scheme making it possible to sell 
butter in storage at a reduced price, as a way of enhancing the rotation and renewal of butter 
stocks) since the possibility of that ought to, due to the Commission’s statements concerning 
the future possibility of such schemes, have been considered by a prudent and discriminating 
trader. In other words, such traders must keep themselves informed and updated, and an 
imported part of that is to read the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
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Furthermore, in the Amylum104 case the Advocate General Reischl held that a legitimate 
expectation is only worth protection if the applicant in question assumed its position on all the 
essential factors known at that time. An example of this can be seen in the CNTA case where 
the Court stated that the consequences could not have been foreseen by a prudent trader.105 
 
Moreover, since the case law expresses a rather heavy administrative burden on the 
companies to be sufficiently informed, it may in practice discriminate against the smaller 
trader, who will have fewer resources to devote to such activity. The concept of a prudent 
trader can furthermore vary in different economic sectors. It is thus harder to entertain 
legitimate expectations in sectors generally recognized as being liable to frequent and sudden 
changes.106 
 
3.2.3 Reasonable Expectations 
Legitimate expectations must, furthermore, be reasonable expectations. When deciding 
whether such expectations exist, regard must be taken to the conduct of a reasonable 
experienced actor on the specific market and whether he would have relied on such 
expectations.107 An example of reasonable expectations is expressed in the CNTA case, where 
the Court held that an undertaking can have legitimate expectations to the fact that the 
Commission does not abolish rules, causing the undertaking unforeseeable losses, without 
adopting transitional measures which can make it possible to avoid such losses. A company 
can furthermore have legitimately expectations to not be induced by a community measure to 
take a decision which can result in negative consequences for it.108 In addition, the 
beneficiaries of a favourable administrative measure, from a Community institution, can have 
legitimate expectations that the decision is not retroactively revoked. This follows since, 
legitimate expectations as to the legality of a favorable administrative act, once acquired, may 
not subsequently be undermined, as long as there is no public-policy interest which overrides 
the beneficiary's interest in the maintenance of a situation which he was entitled to regard as 
stable.109  
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3.2.4 The Balancing of Interests 
As provided, the individual interest must prevail over the public interest. This includes a 
balancing of interests between the company affected, in having its legitimate expectations 
protected, and the public interest.110 This test is however not applied concerning revocation of 
lawful administrative instruments conferring benefits, since the expectations of the individual 
normally prevail over the public interest in such situations. As what concerns unlawful 
administrative measures however, the Court has held that there should be a balancing of 
interests between the public interest and those who had relied on the unlawful measure and 
who had arranged their affairs in consequence.111 The applicant must establish an important 
individual interest and thus show some reliance and detriment in order to override the public 
interest. Since, without such individual interest it is likely that the public interest justifies, for 
example, retroactive acts.112 
3.3 Legal Effects 
Giving a company the possibility to rely on legitimate expectations, several forms of legal 
effects may be the reality. Firstly, such a possibility often renders the community measure 
invalid or partly invalid. An example of this can be seen in the Töpfer case, where the Court 
held that any failure to comply with the principle of legitimate expectations is an infringement 
of the Treaty. Secondly, according to the Mavrides case, not every infringement of the 
principle of legitimate expectations leads to invalidity of the community act. It does however, 
under certain circumstances and under the condition that the applicant has suffered injury, 
justify an award of damages.113 Thirdly and lastly, the retroactive effect of a judicial decision 
may be restricted when, as seen in the Defrenne case,114 economic reasons for legal certainty 
are to prevail over the public interest in lawfulness. As will be shown below, an outcome that 
most often is the legal effect of an approved legitimate expectations claim within the State aid 
field. 
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4. The Principle of the Protection of Legitimate Expectations 
within the State Aid Field – an Exception to Recovery  
The purpose of this part of the thesis is to examine how the protection of the principle of 
legitimate expectation is applied within the field of State aid. And as mentioned above, when 
the right circumstances prevail, such expectations may act as an exception to repay unlawful 
or illegal State aid. Before we examine the potential grounds for such expectations though, it 
is indeed of interest to have a closer look at the judicial context in which the principle may be 
invoked. 
 
4.1 The judicial Context in which the Principle of Legitimate Expectations 
can be claimed 
The Treaty offers mainly two different processes of judicial review; the direct action under 
Article 230 EC and the reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC. And whether 
a State aid process will take either way is dependent on the relevant aid measure and the 
preceding circumstances. The State aid area offers furthermore a third possibility, since the 
procedure under Article 230 EC is preceded by a Commission investigation and a 
Commission decision. 
 
4.1.1 The Procedure before a National Court - a Preliminary Ruling 
The procedure under Article 234 may be applied when the legality of a State aid measure is 
challenged before a national court, for example by a competitor to the beneficiary, or, since it 
is up to the member state to carry out recovery orders from the Commission, when a 
beneficiary has brought an action for annulment of a national authority’s recovery order to a 
national court. Here, according to the Court, it is for the national court alone to assess the 
circumstances of the individual case. It may however be necessary to seek guidance through a 
preliminary ruling.115  
 
The national courts’ jurisdiction stems from the direct effect of the procedural rules under 
Article 88 EC and the so called SFEI-doctrine,116 and the courts are therefore, for example, 
                                                 
115
 See for example Cases C-5/89 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3437, T-67/94 Ladbroke Racing [1998] 
ECR II-1 and T-459/93 Siemens [1995] ECR II 1675. 
116
 Case 120/73 Gebrüder Lorenz GmbH [1973] ECR 01471 para. 8 and Case C-39/94 Syndicat Français de 
l'Express International (SFEI) [1996] ECR I-3547. 
 Recovery of Illegal State Aid – From a Beneficiary’s View                         30 
obliged to protect the rights of individuals affected by violations of the notification and 
standstill obligations.117 This task contains both the rights of competitors and beneficiaries, 
and thus means that national courts can refrain from ordering recovery when it is 
appropriate.118 However, as provided by the SFEI-doctrine, this is merely possible when 
exceptional circumstances prevail. And since the legal standard to be applied, should be 
similar to the one of the Commission under Article 14 of the Procedural Regulation,119 
national courts may only refrain from ordering recovery when it would be contrary to a 
general principle of community law, such as the principle of legitimate expectations.120 
 
4.1.2 The Procedure before the Commission - an Action for Annulment  
If an undertaking on the other hand has had direct contact with the Commission, for example 
through the formal investigation procedure, and this has resulted in a negative decision which 
the company wishes to bring an action against, such an action will be brought directly to the 
Community courts by way of Article 230 EC. The same goes for companies that, without 
being the direct addressee of a decision, are individually and directly concerned by it.121 In the 
State aid field, this situation most often occurs when enterprises have benefited from an aid 
scheme, and not an individual aid measure. 
 
Furthermore, it is not merely possible to claim legitimate expectations before the Community 
courts, since a Commission decision naturally precedes an action for annulment under Article 
230 EC. Thus, the first possibility to make such claims is before the Commission, under the 
procedure of a formal investigation. This follows since, according to the Procedural 
Regulation Article 6, should the Commission launch such a procedure, interested parties are 
to be called upon to submit comments. And as mentioned above, when applied to an aid 
measure initiated against a beneficiary, it can rely on rights as extensive as the rights of the 
defence and thereby a right to be heard. Further, as also mentioned above, should the 
Commission come to a negative decision; it shall nevertheless not require recovery of the aid 
if that would be contrary to a general principle of community law.122  
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4.1.3 Action for Annulment and Preliminary Ruling: Equal Possibilities for Success? 
The reason to why this question is relevant is easiest expressed by the following set of facts. 
To my knowledge, there exist four successful claims of legitimate expectations before the 
Community courts, where all have been the result of an action for annulment. In addition, 
while no claim for legitimate expectations has been approved under a preliminary ruling, this 
procedure has generated much of the significant case law within the field.123 Whereas it thus 
seems impossible to be successful with a legitimate expectations claim under a preliminary 
ruling, there exist however, to some extent explanations, some due to the general features of 
the Community courts’ procedures and some because of the special State aid procedures.  
 
A part of the explanation can be as simple as the fact that the national courts only in rare cases 
deal with these kind of questions, whereas the Commission indeed more frequently has to take 
such considerations. Thus, more of these cases appear before the Community courts under the 
procedure of an action for annulment than under a preliminary ruling.124 In addition, under an 
action for annulment, the Community courts provide a judgment in the specific case, while 
under a preliminary ruling, an interpretation of the relevant EC law, for the national court to 
apply when deciding the outcome of its case, is supplied. This difference is further supported 
by the fact that the national court, under the procedure for a preliminary ruling, is to asses the 
circumstances of the individual case, and whether any exceptional circumstances prevail.125 A 
scenario that was expressed by the answer to the second question in the above mentioned 
CELF-case, where the Court held that the unlawfulness of the aid is to be remedied, save for 
exceptional circumstances.126 And as a consequence, the Court did not have to rule on the 
existence of such expectations, since the answer means that it left it to the national court to 
assess whether any legitimate expectations may hinder a recovery.  
 
The presented explanation may however, to some extent be dependant on the referred 
question, and it is therefore possible that the Court, in a future preliminary ruling, may 
express that a beneficiary can entertain legitimate expectations.127 For example, in the Alcan 
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case,128 the existence of a legitimate expectation was, after a referred question on the 
protection of the recipient’s expectations, thoroughly examined, and if the claim would have 
been approved, the Court would probably have expressed that an applicant in such a situation 
can rely on legitimate expectations.  
 
Furthermore, what concerns the requirement of a precise assurance from a Community 
institution for legitimate expectations to be entertained, such an assurance is indeed more 
often produced under the procedure of an action for annulment. This follows since, as the 
procedure of a preliminary ruling has its starting point at the national court, and often where a 
competitor has brought complains to an aid measure, such an aid measure has rarely been 
notified and thus not been target of a Commission examination or decision. An action for 
annulment under Article 230 EC has on the other hand been preceded by a notification as well 
as a Commission examination and decision. And since it is precisely in such dealings with the 
Commission that a precise assurance may prevail, it is not surprising that claims on the 
principle of legitimate expectations are more successful under the procedure of an action for 
annulment under Article 230 EC.129  
 
There might however be cases where notified and examined aid measures can come before a 
national court, and where the validity of a Commission decision can be questioned through a 
preliminary ruling.130 However, since a company that has had the possibility to challenge a 
decision under Article 230 EC, but did not, not subsequently may challenge it under Article 
234 EC, this procedure is only for beneficiaries without the possibility to bring proceedings 
under Article 230 EC.131 In other words, companies neither the addressee of a Commission 
decision on an individual aid measure nor directly and individually concerned by a decision 
concerning an aid scheme. Therefore, while the enterprise may have benefited from a notified 
and examined aid measure and appears to be in the above mentioned situation, it has most 
likely not been involved in such dealings with the Commission that may create a precise 
assurance, and has consequently less chance to be successful with a legitimate expectation 
claim.  
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Even when taking into consideration that the possibility to be individually and directly 
concerned might be slim, this reasoning seems logic, even more since half of the approved 
cases before the Community courts have concerned such individually and directly concerned 
applicants.132  
 
4.2 An Introduction to the Principle of the Protection of Legitimate 
Expectations in the State Aid Field 
As provided above, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is a general 
community principle, which aims at protecting participants on the market against 
unreasonable and unforeseeable effects, as results of legislators’ discretionary right to adopt 
new decisions or regulations.133 It fills, in other words, a similar purpose in the EC rules 
regime as the air bag does in an automobile. However, at the same time as the principle of 
legitimate expectations has been acknowledged by the Community institutions within the 
State aid field, and whereas it is frequently put forward by beneficiaries as a way of avoiding 
the recovery of State aid, such a claim most often turns out to be a grasp at straws. This 
follows since the Community courts have been considerably reluctant in accepting such pleas, 
and only acknowledged legitimate expectations in exceptionally rare cases.134 Thus, it seems 
as the air bag of legitimate expectations in the State aid area is rather flat and consequently 
not much to rely on. While the Court therefore is sending the message that, when behind the 
wheels you better operate cautiously, the Commission has at the same time recognized the 
possibility to rely on the principle in additional cases, making the notion of legitimate 
expectations more comprehensive. 
 
4.2.1 Procedural Requirements within the State aid Field 
What concerns the possibility to claim the protection of legitimate expectations; it is only the 
beneficiary of the aid and not the member state concerned that may entertain such 
expectations.135 Legitimate expectations can furthermore, as mentioned above, only be 
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successfully invoked if they are the result of a Community institution’s conduct. This means, 
in other words, that a beneficiary can not, against the Commission or the Community courts, 
entertain legitimate expectations to any behaviour put on by the national authority.136  
 
4.2.1.1 The Notification Requirement Revisited 
Before discussing the possible grounds for entertaining legitimate expectations we better, 
once again, have a look at the notification and standstill obligations under Article 88(3) EC. 
Because, it seems as the Community judicatures have given somewhat different answers to 
the same question. Thus, on the one hand, in case C-5/89 Commission v Germany, the Court 
held that, if the aid has not been granted in compliance with the procedure under Article 88 
EC, a company may not, in principle, entertain a legitimate expectation. And a diligent 
businessman should normally be able to determine whether that procedure has been 
followed.137 In the P & O Ferries case it was put as follows: “It is true that a recipient of 
unlawfully granted aid is not precluded from relying on exceptional circumstances on the 
basis of which it had legitimately assumed the aid to be lawful and thus declining to refund 
that aid.” 138 As provided, a claim for legitimate expectations concerning an unlawful aid 
measure should not be possible under normal circumstances, under exceptional circumstances 
however, the beneficiary is not precluded from relying on such expectations.  
 
On the other hand, there are also examples of an opposite conclusion, which, for example, is 
expressed in the Alcan case, where the Court stated that, “undertakings receiving aid cannot 
have a legitimate expectation as to the lawfulness of the aid unless it has been granted in 
compliance with the procedure laid down in Article 93 of the Treaty.”139 Furthermore, it was 
also stated that even a beneficiary of unquestionable good faith can due to the non-notification 
of the member state be unsuccessful when claiming legitimate expectations: “Community law 
requires the competent authority to revoke a decision granting unlawful aid, in accordance 
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with a final decision of the Commission declaring the aid incompatible with the common 
market and ordering recovery, even if the competent authority is responsible for the illegality 
of the aid decision to such a degree that revocation appears to be a breach of good faith 
towards the recipient…”140  
 
It has however been argued that this latter approach is not sustainable since the fact that a 
strictly lawful aid measure cannot, in principle, be target for recovery, as the requirements of 
notification and standstill have been applied with. Thus, such an aid measure is either 
declared compatible and should not be recovered or is declared incompatible and does not 
become implemented, or is nevertheless granted, which rules out the possibility of legitimate 
expectations.141 As provided by Giraud: “Therefore, restricting the possibility of claiming the 
existence of legitimate expectations – which aims at preventing the recovery of an aid – to 
cases of lawful aids that can by definition not be recovered does not seem to make much 
sense.”
142
  
 
Furthermore, while earlier case law not directly has expressed that exceptional circumstances 
may be possible when the member state has failed to notify the aid measure, but merely 
referred to lawful and unlawful measures, the CFI stated the following in a most recent case: 
“However, according to the case-law, a recipient of aid which is granted unlawfully, because 
it was not notified, as is the case of the aid schemes at issue, is not precluded from relying on 
exceptional circumstances on the basis of which it legitimately assumed the aid to be lawful, 
in order to oppose repayment of the aid.”143 This is a most reasonable statement, and even 
though it is not entirely sure that the Community courts will refrain from holding that 
exceptional circumstances are impossible when the aid measure has not been notified, the 
ruling of the CFI has made the situation clearer. In addition, as will also be shown below, the 
Commission has in several decisions approved claims on legitimate expectations despite that 
the aid measure had not been duly notified. Consequently, as the case law now stands, a 
failure of notification should not exclude the possibility to rely on legitimate expectations.  
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4.3 Sources with the Potential of Producing Legitimate Expectations 
As explained, when the right circumstances are present, a beneficiary of unlawful or illegal 
State aid, believed to be lawful and legal, may be exempted from recovery. However, this is 
merely possible when the recovery is contrary to a general principle of community law or 
when exceptional circumstances prevail. Hence, to specify in advance in which situations 
exceptions might be possible is far from easy. The case law of the Community judicatures 
may on the other hand provide a picture of such circumstances. Thus, the following section 
will provide examples of claims commonly put forward by beneficiaries, and whereas the 
main focus is to provide examples of successful pleas and thus potential sources of legitimate 
expectations, also common patterns of disapproved cases will be supplied.  
 
4.3.1 Legitimate Expectations when under the Impression that the Aid has been notified 
The source of legitimate expectations that can be drawn from believing an aid measure was 
rightfully implemented according to article 88 EC, when it in fact was not, is a somewhat 
common claim. It is however generally not a valid ground, because, the scope of this source 
normally brings us back to our diligent businessman, and the fact that he should be able to 
determine whether that procedure has been followed. A recipient undertaking can furthermore 
determine whether a specific aid measure has been notified by reading the Communication 
section of the Official Journal of the European Union, where the Commission’s decisions is 
publicised,144 or simply just pick up the phone and ask the Commission.145 In that respect, the 
notion of this source is consequently not a broad one, if it is a source at all. It seems as the 
possibility to entertain legitimate expectations requires an additional cause. What concerns aid 
measures exempted from notification, such as block exemptions or SGEI, it becomes however 
more difficult for a diligent businessman to find out whether the aid measure is lawful or not. 
This question is however adjacent to the ground concerning difficulties of defining a State aid 
measure, which is discussed below.146 
 
4.3.2 Legitimate Expectations due to an Extraordinary Delay by the Commission 
An extraordinary delay by the Commission as a source of legitimate expectations was 
established by the Court in the Rijn-Schelde Verolme case, and is founded on the delay as a 
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sort of indirect assurance.147 The applicant claimed that, by waiting 26 months before given 
the contested decision, the Commission disregarded the requirements of legal certainty and 
failed to apply with the rules of good administration. The delay therefore caused it to believe 
that the sums allocated by way of the aid in question belonged to the company. As an 
explanation, the Commission expressed that the complexity of the situation made it 
impossible to take a decision sooner. The Court however stated that the aid in question 
concerned only the supplementary costs of one operation, the cessation of the beneficiary’s 
offshore engineering activities, which had already been the subject of aid authorized by the 
Commission, and that the aid therefore was known to the Commission.148 The Court thus 
concluded that “It follows that the Commission’s delay in giving the contested decision could 
in the case in point establish a legitimate expectation on the applicant’s part so as to prevent 
the Commission from requiring the Netherlands authorities to order the refund of the aid.”149 
 
The source of legitimate expectations due to an extraordinary delay has been confirmed by the 
Community courts in additional cases, however without being put in to use.150 The Court held, 
for example, in a more recent case concerning an aid scheme for Sardinian farmers that a total 
delay of four years and nine month, cannot lead to legitimate expectations, when it is not the 
Commission but the member state’s authority that is to blame for the delay.151 The Court did 
furthermore in Case C-298/00 repeat the conclusion in the Rijn-Schelde Verolme case,152 but 
added that “the facts of the case giving rise to that judgment were exceptional and bear no 
resemblance to those in the present case.”153 It also stated that a delay in a case of State aid 
that has not been notified to the Commission may only be imputed from the time when it 
learned of the existence of the aid. The Court therefore concluded that the time between the 
date when the Commission learned about the aid measure and the date of adoption of the 
contested decision, namely less than two years, was reasonable. This followed since the aid 
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had not been authorized by the Commission, neither was it aware of the complex situation in 
which the aid had been granted, thus, an investigation was necessary.154 
 
4.3.3 Legitimate Expectations due to a Positive Commission Decision 
Beneficiaries have furthermore argued that a positive Commission decision, approving the 
relevant measure, could generate legitimate expectations, and therefore preclude recovery 
even if the decision is annulled at a later stage.155 This source of legitimate expectations has 
been discussed in earlier cases,156 and the more recent CELF-case.157 Here, the Court stated 
that a recipient of an unlawfully implemented aid is not precluded from relying on exceptional 
circumstances on the basis of which it had legitimately assumed the aid to be lawful, it cannot 
however, entertain any legitimate expectations when a positive decision has been challenged 
in due time.158 In other words, so long as the Commission has not taken a decision approving 
the aid, and as long as the period of bringing an action against such a decision has not expired, 
the recipient cannot be sure as to the lawfulness of the proposed aid, and therefore not 
entertain any legitimate expectations.159 In addition, the Commission has in one of its 
decisions explained that the public interest in preventing market distortions requires the 
possibility for competitors to challenge a positive decision.160 Thus, where community law 
now stands, this is most likely not a valid source of legitimate expectations.161 
 
4.3.4 Legitimate Expectations due to Difficulties of defining what constitutes a State Aid 
Measure 
As described above, for an aid measure to constitute State aid, four conditions must be met: a 
measure must (1) contain some kind of intervention from a member state or through state 
resources (2) confer a benefit or an advantage (3) distort or threaten to distort competition and 
(4) have an effect on Inter-state trade. And when these conditions are met, and no exemption 
is applicable, a notification to the Commission in accordance with Article 88(3) EC is 
required. What concerns these four conditions however, they have evolved mainly through 
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case law, and there exists a noteworthy degree of uncertainty concerning their application.162 
In addition, as mentioned above, it can be rather complicated to define whether a measure is 
new or existing State aid. 
 
Whereas the Community courts have not explicitly stated that this source is a possible one, 
the problem has been discussed by Advocate General Jacobs and has been accepted by the 
Commission. Advocate General Jacobs expressed it in the SFEI-case, when discussing 
recovery, as doubtful whether a diligent businessman ought to have realised that the measure 
constituted State aid, because the measure in question was not one which self-evidently 
constitute such aid.163 This was since the definition was dependent on whether the beneficiary 
received adequate remuneration for its services or not; a matter that was difficult, if not 
impossible, to verify. Advocate General Jacobs further expressed that the Commission, after 
conducting its preliminary inquiry, decided not to proceed the matter and that the 
Commission, after re-opening its inquiry, failed to reach a decision for a period of more than 
three years. It was thus Advocate General Jacobs opinion that it might be inappropriate to 
order the repayment of the aid. The Court did not, however, elaborate on this question, but 
merely stated that the national court must order the recovery unless, by reason of exceptional 
circumstances, repayment is inappropriate.164  
 
Regarding the Commission, it has in several decisions refrained from ordering recovery of 
unlawfully granted aids with regard to the uncertainty of whether the measure constitutes 
State aid.165 One such decision concerned the Adria-Wien case,166 in which the Court had 
stated that the Austrian measure in the main proceedings, which provided for a rebate on 
energy taxes on natural gas and electricity, did not constitute State aid where it applied to all 
undertakings in a national territory, regardless of their activity.167 Subsequently however, the 
Commission found that the tax rebate in certain industry sectors, while in theory applicable to 
all, in practice benefited undertakings with high energy consumption. The measure was 
therefore selective and constituted State aid. It was however, according to the Commission 
inappropriate to recover the aid, since the wording in the Adria-Wien case “may have led 
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some beneficiaries to believe in good faith that the national measures at issue before the 
national court would cease to be selective, and therefore cease to constitute State aid, if their 
benefit were extended to sectors other than the manufacture of goods.”168 The Commission 
therefore concluded that a recovery would be contrary to the principle of the protection of 
legitimate expectations.  
 
In another example, the Commission dealt with a shareholder loan, which under normal 
circumstances probably would not have constituted State aid, but due to certain declarations 
by the French Government was found to be such aid. This was the result since the declarations 
had the effect of restoring the confidence to the market as the enterprise in question was 
concerned; a fact that turned the shareholder loan proposal into a State aid measure. The 
Commission expressed that it had not previously examined whether this type of conduct 
constitutes State aid, and that, since the conduct preceded the notification of the shareholder 
loan proposal, “a diligent operator could have had confidence in the lawfulness of the 
conduct of the member state concerned”.169 The recipient undertaking could therefore 
legitimately have had confidence in France's conduct not constituting State aid. 
 
What concerns the Orkney Islands Council track-record scheme, it could be considered as a 
case of legitimate expectations both due to difficulties of defining what constitutes State aid 
and because of a prior decision of a similar nature (where the latter will be further discussed 
below).170 The Commission accepted the claim as to the private nature of a fund, since that 
would have excluded the measure from the State aid rules. This was partly because that the 
United Kingdom and the Commission consistently had acted as the fund was of a private 
nature and partly due to a prior decision concerning grants to fishermen on the Shetland 
Islands. It was therefore, according to the Commission, wrongly, but reasonably, for the 
fishermen on the Orkney Island to assume that only private funds had been involved. Hence, 
the fishermen could entertain legitimate expectations to the non-existence of a State aid 
measure. This decision is furthermore an example of a claim of legitimate expectations that 
has been successful despite the fact that no Community institution had given any specific 
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assurance. Thus, the Commission approved the claim although there was no direct link 
between its conduct or the prior decision and the fund. 171 
 
4.3.5 Legitimate Expectations due to a Prior Decision or Judgement of Similar Nature 
This source of exceptional circumstances is built upon expectations to the lawfulness of a 
State aid measure due to a prior decision or judgement by the Community judicatures, where 
a similar measure has been approved, and the judicature has concluded that the measure does 
not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87 EC. Whereas this conclusion can be 
found in several Commission decisions, it has not been directly applied by the Court.  
 
A representative example can be found in a decision concerning a Spanish tax deduction 
scheme, which initially had been notified but later was target for a formal investigation 
procedure. The scheme concerned businesses engaged in export activities, and legitimate 
expectations prevailed due to similarities to a precedent Commission decision regarding a 
French tax scheme. The Commission consequently held that “even the most cautious and well 
informed steel firms could not have foreseen the tax provisions under examination being 
classed as State aid.” And …”they could rightly claim legitimate expectations.”172  
 
This case was followed by several decisions, in which the Commission came to similar 
conclusions. Nine of these were taken between 2002 and 2004,173 and the Commission 
refrained from ordering recovery because of their similarities to a Belgian scheme, which 
according to a previous decision did not constitute State aid.174 The first of the nine cases also 
concerned a Spanish aid scheme. The Commission expressed that, “the Vizcaya coordination 
centers scheme bears close similarities to the scheme introduced in Belgium”.175 
Consequently, “both the Spanish authorities and the sole beneficiary of the scheme were 
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entitled to entertain legitimate expectations that the scheme did not constitute State aid.”176 
This case is however also interesting since the Commission regarded the Belgian decision as 
made public, even though the decision not yet had been published. This was since the 
Commission’s view, at the time, had been expressed in the Fourteenth Report on Competition 
Policy and in an answer to a Parliamentary question.177 
 
While the Spanish case, and the eight cases that followed, compose the mere part of the 
source of legitimate expectations due to prior decisions by the Commission, they are not 
unique. This follows since the Commission, in additional cases, has found reasons to approve 
claims of legitimate expectations, as a result of its prior decisions.178 The Commission has for 
instance, concerning a tax reduction scheme in Gibraltar,179 stated that a beneficiary could 
entertain legitimate expectations due to similarities between the new scheme and an existing 
scheme. This is furthermore an example of a claim that has been approved despite that the 
measure had not been properly notified to the Commission; the circumstances were however 
rather unusual. This was because the aid scheme in question did not only have considerable 
similarities to an existing tax reduction scheme in Gibraltar, but was also, due to differences 
concerning the determination of the annual tax due, less favorable. The Commission repeated 
that “where a diligent businessman could have foreseen the adoption of a community measure 
likely to affect his interests, he cannot rely on the principle of protection of legitimate 
expectations if the measure is adopted.” Given the similarities between the measures 
however, the Commission continued, “…it is hard to see how a diligent operator could have 
anticipated that the two regimes would be subject to different State aid procedures.” It was 
therefore the Commission’s opinion that it was “reasonable to assume that a conscientious 
businessman, acting in good faith, could legitimately have believed that by opting for the less 
generous Qualifying Companies regime rather than the manifestly legal (in State aid terms, 
existing) Exempt Companies regime, he would also enter a regime whose legality was not in 
doubt.” The conclusion was therefore, also in this case, that the recovery would be contrary to 
a general principle of community law.180  
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4.3.6 Legitimate Expectations due to Reliance on Community Soft Law 
As mentioned above, within the State aid area, the Commission has come to heavily rely on 
soft law instruments, such as guidelines, communications and frameworks, as a way of 
enforcing the State aid rules. It is furthermore evident that the Commission prefers to use 
guidelines in certain fields, such as environment and research and development, despite the 
fact that the Enabling Regulation provides it with a formal legal basis to adopt binding rules, 
which could be enforced by national courts.181 What concerns claims on legitimate 
expectations, as an exemption to recovery due to soft law instruments; they are not merely 
rare but also rather unsuccessful. However, while the exemptions to notification have 
increased over the recent years, the importance of the information provided by soft law is 
growing. In addition, more and more information can be found in such law and it is thus of 
value to identify whether they can constitute a source of legitimate expectations.  
 
It is therefore of interest to find out whether soft law, such as guidelines, may produce legal 
effects. This question was discussed by the Court in the recent Dansk Rørindustri case,182 
where it, concerning a guideline on the method of setting fines within the competition area, 
expressed that rules of conduct designed to produce external effects, as is the case of 
guidelines, cannot be precluded from creating legal effects. Thus, by creating a guideline, the 
institution imposes a limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot, where appropriate, 
without breaching general principles of law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations, 
depart from the methods the institution through the guideline has bound itself to.183 The CFI 
has furthermore stated that, “The Commission is bound by the guidelines and notices that it 
issues in the area of supervision of State aid where they do not depart from the rules in the 
Treaty and are accepted by the member states. The parties concerned are therefore entitled to 
rely on those guidelines and the Court will ascertain whether the Commission complied with 
the rules it has itself laid down when it adopted the contested decision.”184 In addition, the 
CFI has expressed that guidelines bind the Commission, albeit that the Commission may 
amend any guidelines if the circumstances so require.185  
 
                                                 
181
 Hancher (2006) p. 13.  
182
 Joined cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri [2005] 
ECR I-05425. 
183
 Ibid. paras. 210-213.   
184
 Case T-176/01 Ferriere Nord SpA [2004] ECR II-03931 76/01 para. 134. See also Case T-35/99 Keller and 
Keller Meccanica [2002] ECR II-261, paras. 74 and 77 and Case T-380/94 AIUFFASS and AKT [1996] ECR II-
2169, para. 57. 
185
 Hancher (2006) p. 13.  
 Recovery of Illegal State Aid – From a Beneficiary’s View                         44 
Consequently, it appears that soft law, such as guidelines, may produce legal effects, save for 
when they depart from the community rules and the judicatures’ case law. This was expressed 
in the Deufil case,186 where the Court concluded that the fact that a specific part of an industry 
was not included in the Commission’s aid code could not give rise to any legitimate 
expectations, since the aid code only provided guidelines and could not constitute exemptions 
from the State aid rules. Hence, the recipient company could not rely on the guidelines as an 
exhaustive source of State aid measures, since, as expressed by the Court, “The aid code 
constitutes guidelines setting out the course of conduct which the Commission intends to 
follow and with which it asks the member states to comply… …it does not derogate from the 
provisions of Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty, nor could it do so.”187 Moreover, in recent 
ASM Brescia SpA case,188 a plea on legitimate expectations concerning the Communication 
on SGEI was dismissed.189 The CFI held that the communication must not itself be regarded 
as a legislative provision but merely interpretative in nature, and that the criteria regarding 
SGEI are those which can be inferred from the Treaty and the case law.190 Similar, in the 
CIRFS-case, the Court found that the Commission was bound by the terms of its policy 
framework, but also stated that the protection of legitimate expectations may not be relied 
upon in order to justify the repetition of an incorrect interpretation of a measure.191 
 
Furthermore, as shown by Case C-91/01 Italy v Commission,192 account must also be taken to 
the purpose behind a soft law. The applicants argued that they had legitimate expectations to 
the approval of their applications for increased aid, since the rules expressed in the SME 
Guideline and SME Recommendation incited them to put in place organisational and 
corporate structures which would make them comply with the rules. Whereas the applicants 
formally met the independence criterion under those rules, the Court held, as the Commission, 
that the purpose, which was clearly expressed by the recommendation and the guidelines, 
leads to the conclusion that the enterprises nevertheless did not meet the criterion. This was 
because the companies, while not owned to more then 25 % by a large enterprise and thus 
meeting the criterion expressed in the soft law, in reality belonged to a large group of 
undertakings, hence breaching the purpose of the rules. As an answer to the applicants claim 
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on legitimate expectations, the Court therefore stated that the Commission merely applied the 
SME Recommendation and the SME Guideline correctly193 and that “the operative part of an 
act is indissociably linked to the statement of reasons for it, so that, when it has to be 
interpreted, account must be taken of the reasons which led to its adoption.”194  
 
In addition, what concerns guidelines and the relation between existing aid measures and the 
implementation of new guidelines, interesting notions can be provided by the Commission 
decision on the aid scheme implemented by Sweden for an exemption from the tax on 
energy.195 Here, the applicants were granted the possibility to rely on the principle of 
legitimate expectations, since the Commission had not published the acceptance by each 
member state of the appropriate measures proposed by it for the implementation of the 
guidelines, as provided by Articles 18 and 26 of the Procedural Regulation and as necessary 
for the guidelines to produce legal effects. And according to the Commission, these 
circumstances may have led some beneficiaries to believe in good faith that the aid measure 
still was to be regarded as existing aid.196 However, the Commission also concluded that it 
was merely possible for the beneficiaries to rely on the principle of legitimate expectations to 
the date of the publication of the Commission’s decision to open the Article 88(2) EC 
procedure, since it at that time must have been clear for the beneficiaries that the measure no 
longer constituted existing aid and that it could be incompatible with the guidelines.  
 
4.4 The Balancing of Interests within the State Aid Field 
As mentioned above, to be able to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate 
expectations, the individual interest must prevail over the public interest. Hence, these 
interests must be balanced. In the field of State aid, this test is however hardly ever mentioned 
explicitly. 197 Yet, the CFI has in one of its rare such cases provided some guidance, since, in 
the P & O European Ferries case,198 the CFI stated that whilst it is important to ensure 
compliance with requirements of legal certainty which protect the private interest, such 
requirements must be balanced against requirements which protect the public interests. The 
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CFI further held that “In the field of State aid, there is an important public interest in 
preventing the operation of the market from being distorted by State aid injurious to 
competition, a fact which, in accordance with settled case-law, requires unlawful aid to be 
repaid in order to reestablish the previously existing situation…”199 And according to the 
CFI, such public interest also encompasses the protection of competitors who have an interest 
in being able to challenge Commission measures which adversely affect them. A different 
conclusion would render the review conducted by the Community judicatures ineffective.200  
 
While the beneficiaries in the P & O European Ferries case were unsuccessful in their 
legitimate expectation claim, the case clearly shows what constitutes the public interest. And 
the public interest, in the field of State aid, is sincerely concerned about the possibility for 
competitors to challenge positive decisions, the review carried out by the Community 
judicatures and preventing distortion of the common market. As the Court held in the SFEI-
case, “Having regard to the importance for the proper functioning of the common market of 
compliance with the procedure for prior review of planned State aid, national courts must in 
principle allow an application for repayment of aid paid in breach of Article 93(3) (now 
Article 88(3)) of the Treaty.”201 And given the importance of the notification and standstill 
obligations under Article 88(3) EC the Court has constantly held that legitimate expectations 
only are possible when exceptional circumstances prevail.202 It can therefore be argued that 
the reason to why the balancing test is so rare within the State aid field is because the 
protection of the principle of legitimate expectations merely is possible when such 
circumstances exist. 203 And when circumstances are exceptional, it is not surprising that they 
prevail over the public interest, and thus make the balancing test redundant.  
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5. Conclusions 
As provided, the beneficiaries play a rather obscure role in the State aid field, since, at the 
same time as they are often somewhat forgotten about they play one of the leading parts. 
Because, without beneficiaries no State aid would exist; with no recipient undertakings an 
important channel of State politics would disappear. This leads to my first conclusion: the 
position of beneficiaries would not be harmed by an increased focus. It can furthermore be 
concluded that the possibility for a beneficiary to rely on legitimate expectations as an 
exemption to recovery, indeed requires, as expressed in the case law, exceptional 
circumstances. However, when such cirumstances prevail, at least the Commission is not 
unfamiliar to grant exceptions.  
 
While the potential beneficiary obtains a rather weak position, this is not entirely the case for 
a beneficiary which the Commission has launched its formal investigation procedure against, 
since, under such circumstances the beneficiary will be able to exchange arguments with the 
Commission. The formal investigation procedure is also the first and foremost successful 
possibility for a beneficiary to claim the protection of the principle of legitimate expectations. 
However, as provided, the applicant can also claim such expectations before the CFI and the 
Court in an action for the annulment of a Commission decision and through a preliminary 
ruling when before a national court. Legitimate expectation pleas have however merely been 
successful before the Commission or the Community courts in an action for annulment. This 
implies that the first and perhaps foremost important circumstance a beneficiary has to show 
is that it is either the addressee of a decision or at least individually and directly concerned by 
it, so that it qualifies for an annulment action under Article 230 EC.  
 
This may however not be the whole truth, since, under the procedure of a preliminary ruling, 
it is often the national court which examines whether any exceptional circumstances exist and 
whether the beneficiary can rely on legitimate expectations. And here, the national court can 
apply the whole range of such sources. In addition, at the same time as the close link between 
being an addressee or directly and individually concerned by a decision - and thus qualifying 
for an action of annulment under Article 230 EC - and the requirements of a specific 
assurance and the procedure under Article 88(3) EC, indeed is important, the notion of 
exceptional circumstances and hence legitimate expectations have very special characters. 
Thus, as mentioned, legitimate expectations have been approved both without a specific 
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assurance and when the obligation to standstill and notify under Article 88(3) EC has not been 
followed. 
 
5.1 The Sources of Legitimate Expectations in the State Aid Field 
Concluded 
The main object of investigation for this thesis has been the possibility for a beneficiary of 
unlawful or illegal State aid, believed to be legal and lawful, to rely on the principle of the 
protection of legitimate expectations, and thus escape recovery. While this is a common claim 
for an enterprise under a recovery order, the success rate for such claims is rather peculiar to 
understand. If one should, for example, merely examine the Community courts’ case law 
without going further, the success rate would be, to say the least, poor.204 Through the 
Commission and its forms of examination and thus its decisions however, the source becomes 
more vivid and comprehensive, and thus the rate of success more positive.  
 
Furthermore, as a consequence to the rather odd notion of legitimate expectations, a large 
amount of the Community judicatures’ decisions contain remarkably diverse sources of 
exceptions. There exist however similarities and the most common and thus clear grounds are 
in my view the following: legitimate expectations due to an extraordinary delay by the 
Commission, due to difficulties of defining what constitutes a State aid measure and due to a 
prior decision of similar nature. What concerns legitimate expectations due to a positive 
Commission decision and when under the impression that the aid has been notified, both have 
been met with reluctance, something that, at least what concerns the latter is understandable, 
since it is indeed easy for a recipient undertaking to confirm whether the member state has 
notified the measure or not. What concerns the former, the case law is rather clear; it is not 
possible to entertain legitimate expectations until the period of appeal is over. This means that 
no member state may, risk free, put the proposed measure into effect until that period has 
expired. At the same time as this equals uncertainty and forces the granter and the beneficiary 
to wait, it is understandable because of the rights of third parties, and their possibilities to 
challenge a decision before the aid measure is put into effect.  
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What concerns the most common and clear grounds, the following conclusions can be made. 
Regarding legitimate expectations due to an extraordinary delay by the Commission, this was 
one of the first grounds of legitimate expectations as an exception to recovery that the Court 
expressed. Since then however, the Community courts have shown quite reluctance, not 
towards the source as such, but what concerns the possibility to be exempted. Thus, while the 
courts have repeated the statements from the successful Rijn-Schelde Verolme case in other 
cases, it has not yet accepted an additional claim on that ground. The Community judicatures 
have however expressed that the circumstances in the Rijn-Schelde Verolme case were rather 
unusual; implying that relying on this source might be rather difficult.  
 
The source of legitimate expectations due to difficulties of defining what constitutes a State 
aid measure is perhaps the most successful category. Whereas this source, in contrast to the 
others, is indeed a wide one, possible of containing rather different cases of legitimate 
expectations, all the provided cases share the same feature: difficulties of defining what 
constitutes a State aid measure. As shown, this is not always an easy task. And due to the 
increasing number of exceptions to notification, it is probably not going to be easier in the 
future. Because, as a consequence, the Commission’s examinations of potential aid measures 
will decrease and the enforcement of State aid rules will be decentralized. Hence, the 
responsibility for granting authorities and beneficiaries to examine aid measures before they 
are put in to effect will increase. And while the granting authority may turn to the 
Commission for guidance, the beneficiary is notably dependent on its own national authority, 
without being able to entertain any legitimate expectations due to its behaviour. Thus, it 
seems as the position of the potential beneficiary has been even more weakened. It also seems 
as soft law may come to play a more important role for beneficiaries, both as a source of 
information and what regards legitimate expectations. 
 
However, concerning legitimate expectations due to soft law as an exception to recovery, it 
has yet to be properly confirmed. As provided though, such soft law will, under the right 
circumstances produce legal effects and can therefore create legitimate expectations. Then 
again, since this must be under the conditions that the soft law does not depart from the 
Treaty, the Community judicatures’ case law and the purpose of the relevant soft law 
measure, it is, on the one hand, rather safe to conclude that this will only be in, to say the 
least, exceptional circumstances. On the other hand however, exceptional circumstances is the 
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trademark of legitimate expectations, and considering the increasing number of soft law 
instruments, it would not be suprising if this source soon was properly confirmed.  
 
Regarding legitimate expectations due to a prior decision or judgement of similar nature, this 
source has been the basis of numerous Commission decisions. It is thus, despite the fact that 
most of them have been generated by similarities to the same decision,205 safe to conclude that 
prior decisions or judgements may generate legitimate expectations to the lawfulness of an 
unlawful or illegal aid measure.  
 
5.2 The Notification Requirement Concluded 
The requirement of notification has indeed an effect on the scope of legitimate expectations. 
Its role has however been somewhat devided. The Communtiy judicatures have for example 
used it as a way of dismissing claims for legitimate expectations, by stating that a beneficiary 
cannot claim legitimate expectations if the aid measure has not been granted in accordance 
with Article 88(3) EC. They have at the same time however also expressed that the 
unlawfulness of an aid does not preclude undertakings from entertaining legitimate 
expectations, and the Commission has at several occasions approved to legitimate 
expectations concerning unnotified aid measures, as provided by several of the above 
mentioned decisions. The CFI did also, most recently express that a legitimate expectation 
claim is not precluded because the aid measure was not notified. 206 This ruling contains, in 
contrast to earlier case law, a clearer statement, and must, in relation to the above mentioned 
facts be seen as the applicable practice. Consequently, it seems as a rather common ground for 
dismissal of legitimate expectation claims no longer exist. 
 
Furthermore, this question may be of increased interest, since the exemptions to notification 
have grown over the recent years, leading to an increased number of unnotified, and thus not 
examined State aids. Most of these will naturally be granted in accordance with Block 
exemptions and the Commission’s soft law, and the problem should not be exaggerated. 
However, since the area contains some difficulties of legal certainty at the same time as 
significant amounts of aid are granted under such exemptions, exceptions to recovery can 
come to be necessary, and thus generate additional sources of legitimate expectations. 
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Furthermore, since it also leads to a diminishing scope of the Commissions review, the 
Commission will not examine as many aid measures, and more room will be left for 
competitors to bring proceedings before national courts because of illegal State aids. This 
may, by way of Article 234 EC, perhaps generate the first successful claim on legitimate 
expectations under a preliminary ruling. Consequently, it is with great interest one may follow 
the development of the notion of legitimate expectations.  
 
5.2 Final Remarks  
The principle of the protection of legitimate expectations was earlier in this thesis referred to 
as the air bag of the EC State aid rules regime; a protection against the unforeseeable, 
something that may save you in the case of misfortune. It is furthermore a device that only 
may help you under exceptional circumstances, since surely, both what concerns automobiles 
and the recovery of illegal or unlawful State aid, such circumstances must prevail for the air 
bag to be put in to use. There are however one important difference: whereas the air bag of a 
vehicle is supposed to set off in a specific situation, the principle of the protection of 
legitimate expectations, and thus the beneficiary, is under the Community judicatures’ 
discretion. Hence, knowing the procedures in the State aid field and, if any problems would 
occur, the potential sources of legitimate expectations may be crucial.  
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6. Epilogue  
6.1 The CELF-case – Further Clearance on the Scope of Legitimate 
Expectations? 
As frequently held by the Community courts, if a beneficiary in a national court, claims 
exceptional circumstances and thus declines to refund an unlawful State aid, it is up to the 
national court to assess the circumstances and if necessary obtain a preliminary ruling from 
the Court.207 This was expressed by the Court in the recent CELF-case, discussed above. And 
since the Court, concerning the recovery of the aid in that case merely stated that the 
obligation to remedy the consequences of the unlawful aid also comprises the aid in question, 
save for exceptional circumstances,208 not much information concerning exceptional 
circumstances was given to the national court. It is thus not surprising that the French Conseil 
d’État, concerning the recovery, has referred two questions to the Court for a preliminary 
ruling. The question of interest for this thesis reads as follows. “Where the Commission has 
on three occasions declared the aid to be compatible with the common market, before those 
decisions were annulled by the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, is such 
a situation capable of being an exceptional circumstance which may lead the national court 
to limit the obligation to recover the aid?”209 
 
Despite the examination just completed, it is not easy to predict a judgement when the notion 
of exceptional circumstances is involved. What can be mentioned though is the fact that all 
three of the annulments by the CFI were carried out within the time limit for appeal, which 
means that there exists no final positive Commission decision. Thus, as expressed under the 
section “Legitimate expectations due to a positive Commission decision”, legitimate 
expectations cannot be entertained if a Commission decision has been challenged in due time. 
Consequently, according to this, there should be no room for CELF to be exempted from 
recovery. On the other hand however, the circumstances in CELF are rather exceptional. 
Since, while no final positive Commission decision has been delivered, CELF has been the 
target of three Commission decisions,210 where the first was taken 16 years ago,211 and five 
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judgments from the Community courts, the last taken in 2008. Hence, a legitimate 
expectations claim might be possible. Anyway, it would indeed be welcomed if the Court 
could bring further clearance and guidance on the scope of the protection of the principle of 
legitimate expectations.  
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